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Ms. Mary Noonan

Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dear Ms. Noonan:
Re:

State v. Salas-Leyva
Case No. 900418-CA

Pursuant to Rule 24(j)# Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Appellant cites Ex parte Carpenter. Ala. Sup. Ct., No,
1900342, August 30, 1991 (49 Cr. Law Reptr. 1510), in support of
his argument that the officers did not have a reasonable
articulable suspicion to detain him based on an informant's tip.
This argument is found at pages 12-13 of Appellant's opening
brief and pages 4-6 of Appellant's reply brief and was discussed
in oral argument. A copy of a digest of the opinion from
Volume 49 of the Criminal Law Reporter is attached hereto.
Very truly yours,

^tft-C.Ldccw
Joan C. Watt
Chief Appellate Attorney
JCW:kll
Attachment
cc ( w / a t t a c h . ) :

Judith S. H. Atherton

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
DELIVERED original and seven copies of the foregoing
to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 23 0 South 500
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and a copy of the foregoing to
the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114, this

day of October, 1991.

Justice Act) may not be used to assist "in [the] pursuit of slate
court remedies" for unexhausted claims. Id. at 1505 (emphasis
in original). Central to Lindsey's holding was the court's
conclusion that state court proceedings were neither "ancillary
to" nor a "proceeding under section 2254." Id. at 1506, 1508.
Consequently, the petitioner's request for the assistance of a
federally appointed lawyer and psychiatric expert fell outside
the terms of both Section 848(q) and Section 3006A.
[Text] Yet here, by contrast, petitioner has not presented a
mixed petition to this court and is proceeding under section
2254. He is thus entitled to appointed counsel, which he has
already received, and such ancillary services as arc "reasonably
necessary" to his representation. This court is persuaded that,
after McCleskey, the research and investigation of new claims
is reasonably necessary to the representation of this capital
prisoner.
Although the doctrine of exhaustion forbids federal courts
from adjudicating a petition that contains any unexhausted
claims, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), it in no way
prevents Congress from funding research and investigation in
federal court that may touch on unexhausted claims.
Exhaustion "is principally designed to protect the state
courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and [to] prevent
disruption of state judicial proceedings." Lundy, 455 U.S. at
518. Under the exhaustion doctrine, it is for the state courts, in
the first instance, to pass upon and correct alleged violations of
prisoners' federal constitutional rights. Id. This requirement
minimizes the instances in which federal courts, by deciding
constitutional issues, will intrude into state processes. McCleskeyy 113 L.Ed.2d at 544.
The investigation of possible claims under section 848 (q)
thus does no violence to the exhaustion doctrine, which is
limited to the adjudication of constitutional claims. That
attorneys Gardner and Derham, while the petition is pending
in federal court, may research and investigate unexhausted
claims—in precisely the same manner that privately retained
attorneys may research and investigate such claims—does not
intrude on state sovereignty. The federal court in no way has
trod on the state court's resolution of the federal constitutional
issues. Following the investigation, the prisoner cither will
decide that a claim exists and pursue it in state court, in
accordance with the exhaustion requirement, or will decide the
claim is not tenable and abandon it.
The rule that district courts should dismiss petitions that
contain unexhausted claims does not mean that a district court
should dismiss a petition merely because the attorney's thought
processes turn to new claims. The latter rule would prove
unduly burdensome both for counsel and for the court. Because
legal claims do not spring fully grown like Athena from the
head of Zeus, an attorney cannot determine, at the outset,
whether this thinking and research will result in an exhausted
or unexhausted claim. Counsel's duty to represent his client
would be severely compromised if his talents and zeal, not to
mention his compensation, were limited to exhausted claims.
Similarly, it would be extraordinarily taxing for the district
court to set the point at which the attorney's efforts were so
directed to the pursuit of an unexhausted claim that compensation would be disallowed. The Supreme Court, in fact, has
already warned district courts against engaging in the "difficult if not impossible task" of sorting exhausted from unexhausted claims. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 519. [End Text/
Once counsel has had the opportunity to conduct preliminary research and investigation sufficient to identify a viable
claim, these proceedings may be stayed in order to permit
exhaustion. At that point, the petitioner will be able to make
an informed choice as to whether to pursue the claim in state
court or waive it.
Comity and federalism address the federal court's consideration of the merits of a claim; we have found no case that
extends these principles to the attorney's investigative process.
Nothing would be gained by returning the case to state court
every time counsel fancies the existence of an unexhausted
claim. There is ample time to do that in the event the petitioner
chooses to assert such a claim. "Federalism" does not require a
game of ping-pong between the state and federal courts.
Coleman has presented a petition containing 13 exhausted
claims. We have previously granted him the time to conduct an
49 CrL 1510

investigation in order to finalize his petition as required by
McCIeskey. Today we hold that Congress has granted him, by
statute, the financial resources necessary to make that opportunity meaningful. — Peckham, J.
INFORMER'S TRACK RECORD OF RELIABILITY
DIDNT SUPPLY REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR STOP
Lack of verifiable details, basis of informer's
knowledge preclude finding of reasonable
suspicion, Alabama says.
A vehicle stop conducted by a police officer on the
basis of a tip from a highly reliable informer was
unconstitutional, a majority of the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals held August 30, because of the officer's failure either to question the informer about the
basis for the informer's rather unspecific claim and the
lack of any corroboration of the tip. (Ex parte Carpenter, Ala SupCt, No. 1900342, 8/30/91)
The tip alleged that the defendant was then driving on
a particular street while in possession of drugs and a
weapon. The officer, who later testified that he considered tips from this informer to be like "money in the
bank," did not ask for more detail or how the informer
came about his information.
The majority concluded that the officer lacked the
reasonable suspicion required for a stop under the
Fourth Amendment. In Alabama v. White, 47 CrL 2148
(US SupCt 1990), the informer was anonymous; on the
other hand, the White informer's credibility was enhanced by the fact that he gave predictive information
that the police could verify. Here, in contrast, the tip
concerned only the defendant's current conduct, and the
only details the police could corroborate before making
the stop were facts anyone observing the defendant could
relate. Furthermore, the tip in White was somewhat
more detailed than the unprobed accusation of the informer in this case. The mere fact that the officer knew
the informer to be reliable cannot, without more, raise a
bare allegation of this kind to the level of reasonable
suspicion, the majority said.
Dissenting, Justice Maddox, joined by Justices Almon
and Steagall, argued that the informer's tip was at least
as reliable as the one in White,
Also dissenting, Justice Houston, noting that the tip
was partially verified, argued that the tip supplied reasonable suspicion for the stop.
Digest of Opinion: Charles Carpenter was indicted for possession of a controlled substance on the basis of evidence
gained through a warrantless search of his vehicle. The trial
court suppressed the evidence, but the court of appeals reversed. Carpenter appeals.
Police officer Griffis testified that he received a telephone
call from an "informant" who advised him that Carpenter
would be driving up South Mobile Ave. in Fairhopc in his own
automobile and that he would be in possession of a firearm and
controlled substances. Officer Griffis said that, before the
arrest, he knew Carpenter and he knew what type of car
Carpenter drove. He further testified that the identity of the
informer was known to him and that the informer was reliable.
Officer Griffis proceeded to South Mobile Ave., where he
observed Carpenter in his car leaving a residential driveway.
Griffis followed Carpenter for a brief period and then stopped
him. After ordering Carpenter and a passenger to get out of
the car, Griffis observed a pistol protruding from a zippered
carrying case. Griffis then searched the car and discovered
controlled substances inside the covering of the gearshift box.
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Griffis placed Carpenter under arrest for the offense of carrying a weapon without a permit.
At the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked Officer
Griffis what kind of drugs the informer said Carpenter had,
where they were located in the car, whether he himself had
seen the drugs and gun in the car, and how he knew they were
there. To all these questions the officer replied, "I didn't ask
him." The defense lawyer asked whether it wasn't "normal
police practice" to ask a tipster questions or to find out about
the reliability or veracity of the information. The officer
replied that those steps arc taken "if you don't have a reliable
informant." In contrast, "this informant, if he tells me something, it's in there, it's like money in the bank. It's there." The
officer testified that on previous occasions the informer had
provided him with information that resulted in the arrest and
conviction of 20 or more people.
The question is whether the officer had a reasonable and
articulable basis to warrant stopping Carpenter's car. In Alabama v. White, the police received an anonymous tip that the
defendant would be leaving a specific apartment building at a
particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with the
right taillight broken, that she would be going to a particular
motel by a particular route, and that she would be in possession
of cocaine inside a brown attache case. Before stopping the
defendant's vehicle, the police verified the apartment building
from which the defendant exited, the particular vehicle she
used, the time the defendant left the apartment building, and
the route she took. The Supreme Court held that the police had
reasonable suspicion to make the stop. The court based its
decision on the fact that the informer was able to accurately
state what would transpire in the future.
We hold, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances,
that the facts of this case did not create a reasonable suspicion
to justify stopping Carpenter on the street. It is clear that
Officer Griffis relied solely on the fact that the informer in this
case was known to him to be reliable. Absent evidence that the
informer had given the police reliable information in the past,
there are no specific or particularized facts on which Griffis
could have based a reasonable suspicion. The informer said
merely that Carpenter would be driving up South Mobile Ave.
He did not state on what he based his knowledge of that fact.
Unlike the facts in Alabama v. White, this information concerned Carpenter's present whereabouts, information available
to anyone who knew him and was near that location. In
Alabama v. White and Dale v. State, 466 So2d 196 (Ala
CtCrimApp 1985), heavy emphasis was placed on the fact that
the informers were able to state where the defendants would be
headed in the future and the fact that the police could
independently corroborate the informers' tips. Moreover, in
White the informer was able to say what type of controlled
substances the defendant would be carrying. In this case, there
was no specific or particularized evidence concerning the type
of controlled substance that Carpenter was carrying in his car,
nor was there evidence that Carpenter had been previously
suspected of possessing controlled substances.
The only factor that would create a reasonable suspicion
that Carpenter was engaged in some kind of criminal activity
was that the informer was known to Griffis to be reliable. This
court is unwilling to say that a police officer, armed with the
scant information from a known reliable informer that a person
is engaged in criminal activity, has reasonable suspicion to stop
the person suspected of the illegal activity. The trial court's
suppression order is affirmed. — Kennedy, J.
Dissent: Alabama v. White involved an anonymous tip. This
case involves a tip by a known and reliable informer. The tip
had a high degree of reliability and the information conveyed
by the tip was substantial. It clearly met the standard for an
investigative stop set out in Alabama v. White. — Maddox,
Almon, and Steagall, JJ.
Dissent: The officer had information from an informer who
was known to him and whose reliability was established by
extensive past experience. The information was partially verified. Under White, the stopping of Carpenter's vehicle was
justified by at least reasonable suspicion. — Houston, J.
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FEEL OF LUMP IN MAN'S POCKET DURING FRISK
DIDN'T ALLOW OFFICER TO PULL OBJECT OUT

Pennsylvania court declines to extend plainview exception to "plain touch."
A police officer who felt a small pebble-like lump in
the pants pocket of a man he had detained and was
patting down for weapons violated the Fourth Amendment by reaching into the pocket and pulling out the
object, a majority of the Pennsylvania Superior Court
ruled August 23. In so holding, the majority refused to
recognize a "plain touch" variant of the plain-view
exception to the warrant requirement, at least under the
circumstances presented in this case. (Commonwealth
(Pennsylvania) v. Marconi, Pa SuperCt, No. 2354 Philadelphia 1990,8/23/91)
The officer justified his retrieval of the item from the
defendant's pocket by testifying that he believed, from
his experience in investigating drug trafficking and his
knowledge that the defendant had a prior methamphetamine conviction, that it was a "rock" of methamphetamine. In fact, it was. But the majority decided that the
chain of events leading up to the drug's discovery did not
supply adequate grounds for the intrusion. The encounter began when the officer became suspicious of the
defendant's conduct, approached him to investigate, and
performed a protective frisk of him for weapons pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). However, the
majority pointed out, a Terry frisk is limited to a cursory
pat-down of the subject's clothing for any weapons he
may possess, and any further intrusion is justified only if
the officer detects the presence of a weapon. None was
detected here, it noted, so the search should have stopped
at that point.
The majority declined to uphold the seizure on the
ground that the officer's tactile perception of the lump
gave him probable cause to believe it was drugs. There
was no way that the "minute" quantity of the drug
inside the pocket could have been identified by the
officer through his sense of touch, it said; the feel of the
object suggested only the possibility of crime, not the
probability of it. The majority deemed the sense of touch
qualitatively different from the senses of sight, hearing,
smell, and taste, each of which yields consistent perceptions every time.
Judge Kelly, concurring in the result, agreed that the
feel of the drugs in the defendant's pocket could not have
given the officer probable cause, but disagreed with the
majority's suggestion that tactile sensations cannot be
factored into the probable cause equation.
Digest of Opinion: Officer Charles Palo, an experienced
drug investigator, was on patrol duty at 7:15 p.m. when he saw
a Cadillac pull into the parking lot of a church and school,
which were closed. Officer Palo parked in a lot across the
street and saw the car's driver, Robert Marconi, exit and
vomit. Marconi then switched places in the car with a female
passenger, Marconi's wife. Officer Palo drove over to the
Cadillac to investigate and determine whether the occupants
were intoxicated and why they were parked next to the school.
Officer Palo approached the Cadillac and, after identifying
himself, saw Robert Marconi apparently trying to conceal
something in the rear of his pants. He told Marconi to place his
hands on the dashboard. The officer was concerned for his
safety. He recognized Marconi and knew that he had previous-
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